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Standard open economy models predict that openness to trade should exert a positive e⁄ect
on the slope of the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄, or Phillips curve, but such a proposition ￿nds
very little support in the existing empirical literature. We propose a new test of this hypoth-
esis based on new measures of the slope of the Phillips curve and more general cross-country
regression models. The results indicate some support for the standard theoretical prediction,
but it is con￿ned to those countries that have maintained ￿ oating exchange rate regimes.
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1 Introduction
This paper tests the hypothesis that the slope of the short-run Phillips curve, de￿ned as the
amount of in￿ ation generated by a unit increase in output relative to trend, varies positively with
openness to trade. A series of cross-sectional regressions are presented, in which the slope of the
Phillips curve is the dependent variable and the regressor set comprises a number of controls
suggested by both closed and open economy models. The results indicate that international
di⁄erences in openness to trade exert a positive e⁄ect on the slope of the Phillips curve (or
output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄) provided that the countries concerned maintain ￿ exible exchange rate
regimes.
This conclusion is at odds with the evidence presented in Temple (2002), which indicates that
openness does not exert a systematic e⁄ect on the slope of the Phillips curve. We suggest two
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1reasons for the di⁄erences between past results and our own. First, previous research has been
based upon a measure of the slope of the Phillips curve due to Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988),
hereafter BMR. This index is derived from very parsimonious regression models, which fail to
control for a variety of long-run in￿ uences on output and in￿ ation and may therefore provide
biased measures of the slope of the Phillips curve. In order to deal with this problem, we replace
the BMR parameter with an alternative measure of the slope of the Phillips curve derived from
a three equation model, which we estimate for 19 countries. Second, previous studies test for
a linear e⁄ect of openness on the terms of the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄, while economic theory
predicts a relationship featuring openness plus its interaction with a country￿ s exchange rate
regime type. We incorporate this interaction term into the cross-sectional regression analysis
and ￿nd that it is very important in identifying the strength of the relationship between openness
and the slope of the Phillips curve.
The robustness of the evidence linking openness, the exchange rate regime and the slope of
the Phillips curve is evaluated in some detail in the second half of the paper. The strength of
the association turns out to be somewhat sensitive to changes in the set of countries used in
the testing procedure. Speci￿cally, the relationship is con￿ned to those OECD countries that
have followed ￿ exible exchange rate policies. As this group comprises just one quarter of the
full set of countries in the sample, excluding a small number of countries from the analysis can
substantially weaken the main relationships identi￿ed using the full sample.
The remainder of the paper expands on these points and has the following structure. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the underlying economic theory. Section 3 reviews some empirical tests of the
theoretical predictions, particularly focusing on issues relating to measurement and model spec-
i￿cation. Section 4 reports the new empirical results that we obtain, and Section 5 rounds o⁄
with a summary.
2 Economic theory
The theoretical basis for the hypothesis that the slope of the Phillips curve is related to openness
derives from the contributions of Romer (1993) and Lane (1997), and is described in non-
technical terms in Temple (2002). In Appendix A we sketch out the details of the Romer model.
The focus is an open economy in which the average price of domestically produced goods is
sticky and therefore adjusts only gradually in response to supply and demand shocks (this could
be due to the e⁄ect of overlapping contracts or heterogeneous costs of price adjustment). In
such a model, the policy authority can adjust the money supply in order to manipulate output
over the short-term, i.e. expansions of the money supply raise both output and prices in the
short-run, such that there is a positively sloped output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄. Only in the long-run,
when all nominal variables have been set to their equilibrium values, does the Phillips curve
take a vertical form in output-in￿ ation space.
Romer argues that monetary policy expansions are associated with depreciation of the nom-
inal exchange rate (the basis for this claim will be discussed shortly). This a⁄ects the slope of
the Phillips curve over the short-term through two separate mechanisms. First, when in￿ ation
is measured in terms of a consumer price index, the e⁄ect of the depreciation will be to add
2to the amount of in￿ ation associated with a particular change in the money supply. Second,
if wages are partially indexed to a consumer price index, or if foreign goods are used as inter-
mediate inputs in domestic production, the output gain to a given monetary expansion will be
reduced. Clearly, both e⁄ects will be stronger in more open economies, because the share of
imported goods and services in both the consumer price index and the producer price index is
larger in such cases. This implies that more open economies will face steeper Phillips curves
in output-in￿ ation space (see Appendix A for a derivation of this result within a simple open
economy model).1
The pivotal assumption in Romer￿ s model is that the monetary policy expansions that drive
the output gap also cause nominal exchange rate depreciations (and also real exchange rate
depreciations, given short-run domestic price stickiness). In the model analysed by Romer,
this follows from the fact that each country is large enough to in￿ uence the international price
of goods through its own supply and demand decisions. Speci￿cally, if domestic and overseas
output are imperfect substitutes in domestic consumption, then a monetary expansion will raise
the desired quantity of imports. In order that these imports be acquired, extra domestic output
must be supplied to the world market. The price of domestic output relative to foreign output
must then fall in order to clear international markets, i.e. there is a depreciation of the real
exchange rate. As this feeds into higher import prices in the country in which the policy shock
occurred, a positive correlation between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve is expected.
A di¢ culty with this argument lies in its ￿rst step: most countries are not large enough
to in￿ uence international relative prices simply by expanding domestic output.2 In order to
overcome this problem, Lane (1997) modi￿es Romer￿ s model so that exchange rates are deter-
mined by arbitrage in foreign exchange markets, as in the Mundell-Fleming model. As is well
known, increases in the money supply generate exchange rate depreciations in this model, while
decreases in the money supply generate exchange rate appreciations. Given that prices are
sticky, these nominal exchange rate dynamics imply that the real exchange rate will depreciate
when the output gap is positive. Embedding these responses in the Romer model ensures that a
country characterised by greater trade openness will face a steeper Phillips curve irrespective of
whether or not it is large enough to in￿ uence international prices through its supply decisions.
The Lane analysis points to one important caveat concerning the relationship between trade
openness and the slope of the Phillips curve: If a country maintains a ￿xed exchange rate regime,
i.e. it does not set monetary policy independently of major trading partners, then expansions of
monetary policy (and hence the output gap) will not be associated with an acceleration of the
import price index, and we would not expect to observe a relationship between trade openness
and the slope of the Phillips curve. In the remainder of the paper, we take this into account
through testing the following conditional prediction:
The slope of the Phillips curve will vary positively with openness to trade, but the
1It should be noted that ￿ openness￿in this context refers to import penetration, as opposed to any alternative
de￿nition based upon the structure of trade barriers, or the mobility of ￿nancial capital.
2This may not be true in the case of a small country that makes a relatively large contribution to world
production of a highly specialised good. However, in practice most countries￿ s trade is very diversi￿ed, so it is
absolute size that determines the ability to in￿ uence world prices.
3strength of this association will decrease as a country￿ s monetary policy authority
increases its commitment to ￿xing the exchange rate.
A ￿nal point that should be noted in relation to the Romer-Lane hypothesis is that the
argument assumes that movements along the short-run Phillips curve are predominantly driven
by monetary shocks, rather than ￿scal policy. This may be a reasonable approximation to
the reality of the past 25 years, for during that time ￿scal policy has been subordinated to
a largely microeconomic role, and monetary policy has been used as the main instrument of
macroeconomic control. Nevertheless, the assumption should be borne in mind when considering
the results reported in this paper.
3 Testing the Romer-Lane hypothesis
The impact of openness to trade on the slope of the Phillips curve has been tested by Temple
(2002), using cross-country regression analysis applied to a sample of 42 countries. The results
indicate that openness (measured as the share of imports in GDP) exerts an insigni￿cant e⁄ect
on the slope of the Phillips curve, and that the estimated relationship is of the opposite sign
to that predicted by economic theory. The robustness of this ￿nding is con￿rmed using a least
trimmed squares estimator, through changing the time period over which the slope of the Phillips
curve is measured and through augmenting the regressions with further control variables.
The reasons for the lack of empirical support for the Romer-Lane prediction are not clear.
Recall that the key steps in the argument are that monetary policy expansions should both raise
output and depreciate the exchange rate (and vice versa), and that exchange rate driven ￿ uctua-
tions in import prices be passed through to consumer prices. Empirical evidence suggesting that
monetary policy a⁄ects output can be found in the literature on GDP forecasting equations,
see, for example, Muellbauer and Nunziata (2001), while the empirical relevance of the third
part of the mechanism is demonstrated in Hendry (2001). It is much less clear that there exists
a systematic link between the stance of monetary policy and the value of the exchange rate, see
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996, p. 621-622). Nevertheless, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) present
econometric evidence indicating that the US dollar appreciates following major contractions
of monetary policy, for example the Volcker de￿ ation of the early 1980s. This suggests that
following major policy interventions the pattern of macroeconomic adjustment necessary for a
correlation between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve does apply, and it is therefore
surprising that empirical studies do not indicate at least some support for the idea.
In this section we suggest two factors that may account for the lack of a correlation between
openness and the slope of the Phillips curve in past studies: the measurement of the slope of
the Phillips curve and the speci￿cation of the cross-sectional regressions intended to explain it.
Measuring the slope of the Phillips curve
The BMR estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve in a particular country is obtained by
￿tting the following regression using annual data for the period 1948-86:
yt = const + ￿￿xt + ￿yt￿1 + ￿t (1)
4The log of real GDP, yt, is regressed on a constant, its own lag, a time trend, and the
change in the log of nominal GDP, ￿xt. The coe¢ cient on the change in nominal demand,
￿, determines how much of a shock to nominal GDP in a particular year shows up in output,
and is interpreted as a measure of the slope of the Phillips curve. An estimate of ￿ close to
unity indicates a very shallow Phillips curve in output-in￿ ation space, while a value close to
zero indicates a very steep Phillips curve. To verify this, note that if we de￿ne p as the log of




[(1 ￿ ￿)yt + (￿ ￿ ￿)yt￿1 ￿ const ￿ ￿t] (2)
In equation (2) the increase in in￿ ation during a year in which a unit shock to output occurs
(after controlling for the linear trend in both variables) is (1 ￿ ￿)=￿. As this magnitude is
decreasing in ￿ for ￿ m 0, it follows that an estimate of ￿ close to unity denotes a shallow
Phillips curve in output-in￿ ation space, while an estimate close to zero denotes a steep Phillips
curve.
A number of authors have criticised this approach to measuring the slope of the Phillips
curve. Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) shows that OLS estimates of equation (1) are subject
to a simultaneity bias. Hutchison and Walsh (1998) argue that the omission of wage and raw
material price e⁄ects from (1) implies that the estimated ￿ coe¢ cient may be distorted by
supply-side shocks that a⁄ect both output and in￿ ation. For example, an oil price hike may be
expected to raise in￿ ation and decrease output, such that estimates of ￿ are biased towards zero.
In practice, ￿ is estimated to be negative rather than positive for approximately one quarter
of the countries studied by BMR. Such a ￿nding is inconsistent with standard formulations of
the Phillips curve, in which output and in￿ ation are positively associated, and suggests that
the BMR index is subject to important measurement biases that may obscure the relationship
between openness to trade and the slope of the Phillips curve.
In this paper we construct new measures of the slope of the Phillips curve for 19 countries.3
The basic idea is to measure the amount of in￿ ation associated with a unit shock to output after
controlling for the non-demand related movements in those two variables. The starting point
for the analysis is the following set of equations:
3This is the set of developed countries amongst the 42 country sample studied by Temple (2002), excluding
Hong Kong, Ireland and Portugal, for which we could not obtain su¢ cient time series data. The sample that we
use does not extend to developing countries because past studies suggest that the in￿ ation process in developing
countries cannot be explained using linear models based on the information set that we utilise in our analysis,
see, for example, Aron and Muellbauer (2000).
















































The variables in equations (3)-(5) are in natural log form, and observed at the quarterly
frequency. The variable de￿nitions are as follows: p denotes the price level, gap is the deviation
of output from trend, ulc is unit labour costs, usoil is the US$ price of oil and t is a time trend.
The procedure that we follow in deriving a measure of the slope of the Phillips curve from this
set of equations is as follows:
1. Equations (3)-(5) are estimated separately by OLS using quarterly data
running from the late 1970s to the late 1990s4 (the exact sample periods di⁄er slightly
across countries, see Appendix B for further details and for information concerning
the measurement of the variables in (3)-(5)).
2. Each equation is reduced to a parsimonious form using the PcGETS
algorithm developed by Hendry and Krolzig (2001). This is a computer programme
that carries out automated reduction of highly parameterised time series equations
to their minimum dimensions, through repeated estimation of the equation by OLS.
The criteria used in implementing this general-to-speci￿c modelling strategy include
the individual and joint signi￿cance of the variables, and the outcomes of residual
diagnostic tests and tests for parameter stability.
The programme o⁄ers the choice between a ￿ liberal￿strategy, which min-
imises non-selection of variables, and a ￿ conservative￿strategy, which minimises non-
deletion. The liberal strategy was adopted in this exercise. An outlier correction
procedure (available as part of the programme) was also used. This assigns a dummy
variable to extreme observations so that they cannot distort the results, see Hendry
and Krolzig (2001) for details.
3. The tested down versions of (3)-(5) were then re-estimated as a three
equation system using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator
4The sample periods begin after the dissolution of the Bretton Woods ￿xed exchange rate regime in 1973 and
end before the introduction of the single European currency in January 1999.
6available in the PcGIVE10 package of Hendry and Doornik (2001). This systems
method increases the e¢ ciency of the estimation.5
4. The three equation systems were then used to compute the response of
in￿ ation to a unit increase in gapt at horizons t + 1, t + 2, t + 3 and t + 4 using the
impulse response command in PcGIVE10. The sum of those four quarterly responses
de￿nes the new measure of the slope of the Phillips curve, and is denoted PC.
We note two features of the procedure used in testing down from the general model in (3)-(5)
to the speci￿c model used for calculating the impulse responses. First, as it uses information
on equation stability and the properties of the residuals, the ￿nal speci￿cation that it delivers
provides a reliable basis for measuring the dynamic impact of the output gap on in￿ ation.
Alternative models that yield serially correlated errors or unstable coe¢ cients are clearly less
reliable - see Hendry and Krolzig (2003) for further details on the properties of PcGETS. Second,
as the procedure is automated, the possibility that arbitrary reductions of equations (3)-(5)
deliver estimated Phillips curve parameters that correlate with openness purely by chance is
avoided.6
The impulse response analysis used to construct the PC index measures two types of e⁄ect.
First, in equation (3), the impact of the output gap on in￿ ation is evaluated holding constant
all ￿ uctuations in real unit labour costs and US$ oil prices relative to domestic prices.7 As these
two conditioning variables are likely to capture the e⁄ects of major supply shocks arising in
labour markets and commodity markets, the partial derivative calculated from (3) is less likely
to be a⁄ected by omitted variable bias than is the BMR parameter. Second, equation (5) is used
to measure the amount of in￿ ation arising indirectly through the output gap feeding into real
unit labour costs, and real unit labour costs then entering the equation for in￿ ation. Through
combining these two e⁄ects, PC measures the full derivative of in￿ ation with respect to the
output gap.
The US$ price of oil, usoil, is a non-modelled variable in (3)-(5), which means that the
output gap does not a⁄ect in￿ ation through ￿rst raising the US$ price of oil. This is a reasonable
assumption because any single country normally represents a small share of the global oil market,
and is therefore unlikely to be able to in￿ uence US$ oil prices. An obvious exception to this
rule is the United States itself, of course. In order to cast some light on the size of demand-side
contributions to real oil prices in the United States, we ran an OLS regression of real oil prices
on four lags in real oil prices and four lags in the output gap. None of the output gap coe¢ cients
turned out to be signi￿cant, even when we tested the model down to a parsimonious form, and
we therefore continue to treat oil prices as exogenous in the determination of the output-in￿ ation
tradeo⁄.
5The systems estimator cannot be applied to the general-to-speci￿c modelling because the PcGETS software
does not yet allow for such an approach.
6All of the computer output corresponding to this section of the paper is available on request.
7The use of input costs relative to domestic prices (as opposed to the ￿rst di⁄erences of input prices) as a
means of controlling for supply-side in￿ uences on in￿ ation follows the ￿ error correction￿approach to modelling
in￿ ation ￿ uctuations, see, for example, de Brouwer and Ericsson (1998).
7The most general forms of the in￿ ation and real unit labour cost equations contain a cubic in
time. These deterministic terms are intended to capture any non-demand related in￿ uences on
those two variables that are not controlled for by the other explanatory variables, e.g. changes
in product market structure that a⁄ect in￿ ation via the price-cost markup, or changes in trade
union power that a⁄ect real unit labour costs. Finally, note that all contemporaneous terms
are excluded from (3)-(5) in order to ensure that the regressor set is pre-determined and that
simultaneity biases do not a⁄ect the estimation. One disadvantage of this approach is that the
Phillips curve is constrained to be completely ￿ at during the quarter in which a shock occurs,
and can only exhibit a positive slope in the four subsequent quarters. In contrast, the BMR
method measures the response of in￿ ation to the output gap over four quarters, including that
quarter in which a shock occurs.
The PC parameters for the 19 countries that we study in this paper are listed in Appendix
C alongside the versions of the BMR statistic calculated using annual data for 1973-86. In
contrast to the BMR index, the PC parameter is non-negative, suggesting that the multivariate
techniques used to control for the in￿ uence of supply-side shocks have been e⁄ective. The Phillips
curve parameters range from 0 to 1.309, and the mean parameter value across the 19 countries
is 0.447, indicating that a 1% increase in GDP relative to trend adds, on average, approximately
0.5% to the annual in￿ ation rate in the ￿rst year. As a simple check on the robustness of the
results, we also calculated total in￿ ation responses to a unit shock to the output gap in period t
over the horizon t+1, ...... , t+8. The correlation between the two indices was .845, indicating
that the pattern of international di⁄erences in the slope of the Phillips curve is not very sensitive
to changes in the time horizon over which in￿ ation responses are calculated.
In six cases the slope of the Phillips curve is found to be zero during the ￿rst four quarters
following a shift in the output gap. In three of these instances, Italy, the Netherlands and
Sweden, this is due to the output gap raising in￿ ation indirectly via its e⁄ect on real unit labour
costs, and the total lag in that e⁄ect exceeding four quarters. In the other three cases, Austria,
Denmark and Spain, there appears to be no Phillips curve relation at any horizon. One reason
for this may be that the output gap a⁄ects in￿ ation with a lag of more than four quarters in
those three countries. Allowing each of these six countries to have a positively sloped Phillips
curve through adding gapt￿1 to the in￿ ation equation leads to a set of PC parameters that has
a 99.65% correlation with the original set. This suggests that the horizontal Phillips curves that
we identify are not an artefact of the model selection procedure.8
The correlation between the PC index and the BMR parameter measured over 1973-86 is
-.341, which indicates some agreement between the two approaches as to which countries face
relatively steep Phillips curve (recall that the BMR index decreases with the slope of the Phillips
curve, so a negative correlation is to be expected if the two indices are in agreement).9 However,
8The absence of a Phillips curve e⁄ect in many of these countries is con￿rmed in a more detailed study
of OECD in￿ ation featuring higher order dynamics and unobserved components in the estimation process, see
Bowdler (2003).
9The correlation statistic that has been calculated understates the amount of agreement across the two ap-
proaches because (i) the sample periods are not identical; (ii) PCi is comparable with [
1￿￿
￿ ]i, not ￿i (we cannot
calculate [
1￿￿
￿ ]i, however, because ￿i is estimated to be less than zero in some cases, such that the required
transformation is non-monotonic and therefore would not produce meaningful results).
8the correlation coe¢ cient is still very far from minus one, suggesting that a test of the Romer-
Lane hypothesis based upon the PC index may yield di⁄erent conclusions to those reached by
Temple (2002) using the BMR parameter.
Specifying a cross-country regression
A second potential reason for the absence of a correlation between openness and the slope
of the Phillips curve in Temple (2002) is that the cross-sectional regression models employed
are not general enough. The theoretical discussion in section 2 suggests that the slope of the
Phillips curve is (potentially) determined as follows:
PCi = const + ￿1 ￿ OPENi + ￿2 ￿ (OPENi ￿ EXi) (6)
where PCi is the slope of the Phillips curve in country i, OPENi measures the openness of
country i and EXi measures the extent to which monetary policy in country i is set to stabilise
the exchange rate, i.e. EXi takes a relatively large value if country i maintains a ￿xed exchange
rate regime. If the predictions of the Lane model are correct then ￿2 will be estimated to be
negative, and the magnitude of ￿2 will measure the extent to which the e⁄ect of openness in
steepening the Phillips curve is ￿ turned o⁄￿when country i ￿xes its exchange rate. The cross-
sectional models ￿tted by Temple implicitly assume ￿2 = 0, thereby eliminating the interaction
term from the regression. If that omitted term is positively correlated with OPEN, and if
￿2 < 0, as predicted by theory, then OLS estimation of (6) will yield a ￿tted value of ￿1 that is
biased towards zero.
In order to examine the impact of openness on the slope of the Phillips curve after controlling
for cross-country di⁄erences in the exchange rate regime, we construct an empirical counterpart
to the variable EX. First, we take monthly data on the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate of
country i over the same period as that used to measure PCi. We then scale the exchange rate
series by its mean, regress it on a constant and a time trend and calculate the residual standard
error. These measures of exchange rate volatility are graphed in descending order in Appendix
D. We identify three sub-groups within the sample, corresponding to high, intermediate and
low levels of exchange rate volatility, and used this sample split as the basis for an exchange
rate regime indicator, e, where ei = 2 for the high levels of exchange rate volatility, ei = 1 for
intermediate levels of exchange rate volatility and ei = 0 for low levels of exchange rate volatility
(see Appendix D for the results).
The classi￿cation of countries across the three groups is broadly consistent with prior knowl-
edge of the exchange rate regimes maintained by individual countries. For instance, the strict
￿xed exchange rate group comprises Germany and the smaller European countries that adhered
most closely to the principles of the European Monetary System (EMS). The semi-￿xed group
mainly comprises the larger European countries whose currencies were less closely linked to the
Deutsche Mark, e.g. Italy and the UK (both of whom eventually had to suspend membership of
the EMS), Spain and France (who remained a part of the EMS only through widening the target
zones for their currencies) and the Scandinavian countries, who opted for greater exchange rate
￿ exibility following major macroeconomic shocks in the 1980s and 1990s (see Lindbeck (1997)).
Lastly, the ￿ exible exchange rate group mainly consists of non-European countries, which have
9not participated in a scheme like the EMS. The main exceptions to such rules are Greece (which
appears in the ￿ oating group rather than the semi-￿xed group) and Canada (which is in the
semi-￿xed group rather than the ￿ oating group).
In order to ensure that the variable EX has a zero mean and varies positively with the




where e￿ denotes the mean of ei.
4 Empirical results
In this section we investigate whether the lack of a correlation between openness and the slope of
the Phillips curve reported in Temple (2002) is robust to using the PC index instead of the BMR
index, and to controlling for an interaction between openness and the exchange rate regime. In
order to make comparisons between past research and our own we use three measures of the
slope of the Phillips curve: ￿￿1, the negative of the BMR tradeo⁄ parameter calculated for
1948-86, ￿￿2, the negative of the BMR tradeo⁄ parameter calculated for 1973-1986, and PC,
the tradeo⁄ measure described in section 3.10 As the regressand is always a derived variable, t-
ratios are calculated using the heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors due to White (1980).
The absolute values of those t-ratios are reported in parentheses in Table 1. Openness to trade
is measured as the mean of the ratio of total import spending to nominal GDP in country i over
the time period used in measuring PCi. The results of a chi-square test for residual normality
due to Doornik and Hansen (1994) are also quoted (the null hypothesis is that the residuals are
normally distributed).11
10We use the negatives of the BMR tradeo⁄ measures in order to ensure that, like PC, the indices increase
with the slope of the Phillips curve. Strictly speaking, one should use the value
(1￿￿￿)
￿￿ when making comparisons
with PC. However, as the BMR parameter is actually negative for some countries, this transformation is non-
monotonic.
11All regression estimates reported in this paper were obtained using the PcGIVE package of Hendry and
Doornik (2001).
10Table 1: Openness and the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄
Regression (1) (2) (3)
Dependent VariableA ￿￿1 ￿￿2 ￿￿2
Sample Size 19 19 19
CONSTANT -.2825 (2.17)B -.5686 (4.46) -.7187 (3.06)
OPEN -.1395 (.39) .3107 (.93) .9114 (1.09)
OPEN ￿ EX -.4053 (.83)
Normality TestC 1.54 (p = .46) .30 (p = .86) .35 (p = .84)
R2 .004 .02 .06
Regression (5) (6) (7)
Dependent VariableA ￿￿2 PC PC
Sample Size 15 19 19
CONSTANT -.7382 (3.79) .5829 (3.32) .0451 (.21)
OPEN 1.0584 (1.38) -.4643 (1.11) 1.6888 (2.32)
OPEN ￿ EX -.5525 (1.28) -1.4526 (3.60)
Normality TestC 1.01 (p = .60) 5.58 (p = .06) .85 (p = .65)
R2 .18 .02 .33
A: ￿1 is the BMR tradeo⁄ parameter calculated for 1948-86. ￿2 is the BMR
tradeo⁄ parameter calculated for 1973-1986. PC is the new tradeo⁄ parameter
described in Section 3 of this paper.
B: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-ratios calculated using the
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors due to White (1980).
C: The normality test for the residuals is due to Doornik and Hansen (1994).
The null hypothesis is that the residuals are normally distributed.
The model in column (1) con￿rms the ￿nding in Temple (2002) that openness is both in-
correctly signed and insigni￿cant in a bivariate regression for the BMR measure of the output-
in￿ ation tradeo⁄. It is important to note that Temple￿ s result is robust to restricting the sample
from 42 countries to 19 countries.12
An obvious drawback to testing the Lane hypothesis using the 1948-86 BMR parameters
is that the Bretton Woods ￿xed exchange rate system was e⁄ective for roughly two thirds of
that period. The relationship between openness to trade and the slope of the Phillips curve
would not be expected to operate under ￿xed exchange rate conditions, at least not via the
mechanism proposed by Lane. This problem can be overcome through replacing the full sample
BMR tradeo⁄parameter with one estimated for the sub-period 1973-86. Column (2) shows that
although the coe¢ cient on openness takes the expected positive sign when ￿￿2 is the dependent
variable, it is still insigni￿cant. In column (3) we add the interaction between openness and
12The BMR sample actually has 18 countries in common with the sample studied in section 3, New Zealand
being the country that was included in the latter sample but not the former. However, we are able to expand
the sample to 19 countries in Table 1 through using a measure of the slope of the Phillips curve in New Zealand
provided by Froyen and Waud (1995) using exactly the same data sources and econometric methods as BMR.
11the exchange rate regime. The slope coe¢ cients are correctly signed in this model and the
t-ratios are larger than in (2), but the magnitudes of the estimated e⁄ects are some way from
achieving signi￿cance at the 5% level. A potential reason for this is that the BMR tradeo⁄
parameter is subject to measurement bias, as argued in section 3. To investigate this possibility
we re-estimate the model after excluding from the sample the United Kingdom and Norway
(the two countries that are closest to having vertical Phillips curves according to ￿￿2) and
Germany and Denmark (the two countries that are closest to having horizontal Phillips curves
according to ￿￿2). These four countries are at the extreme ends of the range of Phillips curve
parameters generated by the ￿2 index, and are therefore likely to be the countries for which the
index generates the largest amount of measurement bias. The results, presented in column (4),
indicate that the e⁄ect of openness is signi￿cant at the 20% level, suggesting that measurement
bias may be obscuring the link between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve.
In columns (5) and (6) we use PC as the dependent variable. The key result apparent from
these two regressions is that whilst there does not exist an unconditional relationship between
openness and the slope of the Phillips curve, the expected positive e⁄ect does emerge after
controlling for an interaction between openness and a country￿ s exchange rate regime. Further,
the inclusion of OPEN ￿ EX in the regression increases the R2 statistic from .02 to .33. The
importance of the interaction e⁄ect is due to the fact that the sample includes several countries
that have been in quasi-monetary union with Germany since the late 1970s. As the majority of
monetary policy shocks in those countries have originated in Germany, they have not induced
exchange rate adjustment relative to major trading partners. This means that large changes in
import prices do not occur in those countries following expansions of the output gap, and that,
as a result, Phillips curves in those countries have not been as steep as their openness to trade
would predict.13
In section 3 we noted that the results of the exchange rate regime classi￿cation were slightly
surprising, in that Canada was placed in the semi-￿xed group rather than the ￿ exible group, and
Greece was placed in the ￿ exible group rather than the semi-￿xed group. If EX is reconstructed
based upon Canada being in the ￿ exible group and Greece being in the semi-￿xed group, the
results (which are not reported in the Table 1) are slightly stronger than those in column (6). The
coe¢ cient on OPEN rises to 1.99 (robust t-ratio is 2.44), while that on OPEN ￿EX becomes
-1.64 (robust t-ratio is -3.52). It therefore appears that the relationship between openness and
the slope of the Phillips curve is not dependent on the precise classi￿cation of exchange rate
regimes outlined in section 3.
In order to cast further light on the relationship between the slope of the Phillips curve,
openness to trade and the exchange rate regime, we consider the conditional scatter plots in
Figure 1. We de￿ne PC￿ as the set of residuals from a regression of PC on OPEN ￿EX, while
OPEN￿ is the residual series from regressing OPEN on OPEN ￿EX. The plot of PC￿ against
OPEN￿ and the associated line of best ￿t indicates the strength of the relationship between
13The coe¢ cient estimates in column (6) indicate that ￿xing the exchange rate to the extent that countries
such as Austria have done almost completely ￿ turns o⁄￿the e⁄ect of openness on the slope of the slope of the
Phillips curve. However, given the large error bands associated with the coe¢ cient estimates in Table 1, this
conclusion can only be a tentative one.
12the slope of the Phillips curve and trade openness after controlling for the exchange rate regime.
Similarly, PC￿￿ and OPEN ￿ EX￿ are de￿ned as the residual series from regressing PC and
OPEN ￿ EX respectively on OPEN.
Figure 1: Conditional e⁄ects on the slope of the Phillips curve
The plots in Figure 1 suggest that the relationship between openness, the exchange rate
regime and the slope of the Phillips curve may derive from the in￿ uence of a small number
of observations in the sample. Speci￿cally, the two observations in the northwest of the lower
plot appear to explain a large part of the e⁄ect associated with the exchange rate regime in
column (6). These points correspond to the observations for Greece and New Zealand, two
of the countries from the ￿ exible exchange rate group. Excluding these two countries from
the sample causes the relationship in column (6) to disappear - the coe¢ cient on openness
falls to 0.4424 (robust t-ratio is 0.49), while the coe¢ cient on the interaction term falls to -.6042
(robust t-ratio is 1.03). This ￿nding re￿ ects the fact that the relationship between openness and
the slope of the Phillips curve is only apparent amongst those countries that have maintained
￿ exible exchange rate regimes. The correlation between PC and OPEN is .93 for the ￿ exible
exchange rate countries, but -.05 for the semi-￿xed group and -.08 for the ￿xed group. As Greece
and New Zealand represent the more open economies amongst the ￿ exible exchange rate group
(Australia, Japan and the United States are less open), deleting them from the sample means
that a positive and signi￿cant relation between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve
cannot be identi￿ed, essentially due to a lack of variation in the data.14
14If one adopts the alternative exchange rate regime classi￿cation in which Canada is in the ￿ exible group and
Greece is in the semi-￿xed group, then the relationship between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve
13In view of this ￿nding, we suggest the following summary of the relationship between the
slope of the Phillips curve, trade openness and the exchange rate regime in OECD countries.
First, as approximately one quarter of OECD countries have maintained ￿xed exchange rate
regimes since the 1970s, the conditions necessary for a correlation between openness and the
slope of the Phillips curve have not been in place. Therefore, as expected, the slope of the
Phillips curve does not increase with openness within that group of countries. Second, amongst
those countries have followed semi-independent monetary policy, the relationship between trade
openness and the slope of the Phillips curve is again absent. One reason for this may be that
some measurement errors continue to a⁄ect estimates of the slope of the Phillips curve, e.g. due
to ￿scal policy a⁄ecting the output gap, or due to the controls used in (3)-(5) not handling the
e⁄ects of all supply shocks. As the relationship between openness and the slope of the Phillips
curve is likely to be a rather weak one amongst the semi-￿xed exchange rate group, it may be
obscured by small measurement errors. Third, amongst those countries that have maintained
￿ exible exchange rate regimes the relationship between openness and the slope of the Phillips
curve is positive and in line with the predictions based on the models of Romer (1993) and
Lane (1997). In the cross-country regressions reported in this paper, it is the ￿ exible exchange
rate countries that drive the results, and as this group comprises just one quarter of the full
sample, the regression results turn are sensitive to excluding a small number of countries from
the sample. Thus, overall, empirical evidence on the Romer-Lane hypothesis based upon new
measures of the slope of the Phillips curve is mixed - a positive relationship between openness
and the slope of the Phillips curve is apparent amongst ￿ exible exchange rate countries, but it is
not apparent amongst countries that have sought to limit exchange rate ￿ uctuations, suggesting
that the underlying mechanism may be quite weak.
4.1 Controlling for closed economy e⁄ects on the Phillips curve
In this sub-section we extend the cross-sectional regressions in Table 1 to include further poten-
tial determinants of the slope of the Phillips curve. The ￿rst variable that we add to the analysis
is a measure of in￿ ation performance, calculated as the mean quarterly percentage in￿ ation rate
in a particular country over the period for the which the slope of its Phillips curve was estimated
in section 3. The motivation for the inclusion of this regressor is that ￿rms in high in￿ ation
countries have an incentive to reset prices more frequently than ￿rms in low in￿ ation countries,
because high in￿ ation means that ￿rms face large relative price distortions if they leave absolute
prices unchanged, see Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988). We also condition on a set of labour
market variables used by Temple (2002). RIGIDITY measures the mean lag for the e⁄ect of
unemployment on wages, and is taken from Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983). The index
decreases with the speed of wage adjustment and is therefore expected to enter the model with
a negative sign. INDEXATION takes the value 0;1 or 2 if wage indexation is, respectively,
totally absent, partial or widespread. DUR measures the duration of price contracts and is also
re-appears, essentially because Canada is a relatively open economy within the ￿ exible exchange rate group and
has a steep Phillips curve relative to the United States and Japan. However, given that the data ￿rmly suggest
that Canada belongs in the semi-￿xed exchange rate group (cf. the discussion in section 3), we do not attribute
too much importance to this ￿nding.
14set to 0;1 or 2, with higher values indicating relatively short price contracts. Both variables
are taken from Bruno and Sachs (1985) and are expected to enter the regression with a positive
sign.15 As observations on these variables are not available for all countries, the sample size
changes slightly across model speci￿cations. For clarity, the exact sample size is quoted above
each set of results in Table 2.
Table 2: Closed economy e⁄ects on the slope of the Phillips curve
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressand PC PC PC PC PC
Sample Size 19 19 18 17 17
CONSTANT .36 (3.35) .04 (.17) .10 (.34) .15 (.62) .12 (.41)
OPEN 1.77 (1.81) 1.50 (1.42) 1.46 (1.12) 1.30 (1.46)
OPEN ￿ EX -1.52 (2.47) -1.34 (2.10) -1.35 (1.89) -1.30 (2.17)




Normality 3.85(p=.15) .74(p=.69) 1.08(p=.58) .96(p=.62) .94(p=.63)
R2 .09 .33 .24 .26 .25
Notes: See notes B and C to Table 1.
In column (1) of Table 2 we report a bivariate regression of PC on the square of mean
in￿ ation (the square of in￿ ation is used instead of the level on grounds of best ￿t). The results
are consistent with the notion that high in￿ ation induces more frequent price-setting and a
steepening of the Phillips curve. This is in line with the results obtained by BMR themselves
using their single equation measure of the slope of the Phillips curve. The picture changes in
regression (2), which adds open economy variables. The in￿ ation term is insigni￿cant and in-
correctly signed, whilst openness and the interaction between openness and the exchange rate
regime have the expected sign. We interpret this outcome as a result of the high degree of
intercorrelation between openness, the exchange rate regime indicator and average in￿ ation. As
noted by Romer (1993), openness and the exchange rate regime tend to be important determi-
nants of a country￿ s in￿ ation performance. Consequently, when average in￿ ation is added to a
regression for the Phillips curve parameter that already controls for open economy variables, it
does not increase the explanatory power of the model.
The models in regressions (3)-(5) show that labour market variables do not help to explain
cross-country di⁄erences in the slope of the Phillips curve. In each case the size of the coe¢ cient
on openness decreases slightly compared to that in column (6) of Table 1, and the standard errors
increase quite sharply. However, this is mainly due to the reduced number of degrees of freedom
compared to the Table 1 regressions.
15It should be noted that the labour market variables are measured over di⁄erent periods to PC. As such, they
are not suitable regressors in models for PC. We include them nevertheless, on the grounds that they are used
in Temple (2002).
154.2 Controlling for potential regressor endogeneity
The relationship between openness, the exchange rate regime and the slope of the Phillips curve
may be driven by reverse causation bias. For example, suppose a country faces a relatively
￿ at short-run Phillips curve. A given sequence of aggregate demand shocks in this country
will generate a relatively low variance in￿ ation process and therefore a low variance detrended
exchange rate, such that PC and OPEN ￿EX could correlate negatively even when the Romer-
Lane mechanism does not play a part in the determination of the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄.
In order to deal with potential endogeneity biases we consider regressions estimated via two-
stage least squares (2SLS). The model that we concentrate on is that in which PC is regressed
on a constant, OPEN and OPEN ￿ EX.16 We maintain the assumption that OPEN is
exogenous, but now treat OPEN ￿EX as endogenous, and draw instruments from the following
set of variables: population size in 1990 (POP), the level and square of 1980 per capita income
in US$ (INCOME) and an index of central bank independence (CBI) that decreases as a
central bank becomes more independent.17 In Table 3 we report regression estimates based
upon di⁄erent combinations of instruments. The absolute t-ratios given in parentheses are
based on the corrected standard errors computed by the PcGIVE package, see Hendry and
Doornik (2001). The R2 statistic is not uniquely de￿ned for 2SLS estimates, so here we report
the regression standard error as a measure of ￿t for each speci￿cation. The Sargan statistic
that we report tests the null hypothesis that the instrument set is valid in the sense that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the errors generated from a regression of PC on all of the
exogenous variables directly, see Hendry and Doornik (2001).
Table 3: Regressions for the tradeo⁄ parameter estimated by 2SLS
Regression (1)A (2)B
Dependent Variable PC PC
Sample Size 19 19
CONSTANT -.09 (.23) .11 (.28)
OPEN 2.22 (1.56) 1.44 (.99)
OPEN ￿ EX -1.81 (2.13) -1.28 (1.46)
Normality Test .68 (p = .71) .97 (p = .62)
Standard Error 0.38 0.38
Sargan Test .19 (p = .66) 3.99 (p = .14)
The t-ratios are based on standard errors corrected for 2SLS estimation.
The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the errors in the unrestricted reduced form equation.
A: Instruments: OPEN, POP, CBI.
B: Instruments: OPEN, POP, INCOME, INCOME2.
In column (1) we use population size, central bank independence and openness as instruments
16We also applied 2SLS to a model in which mean in￿ ation is used as an explanatory variable. The results
indicated that the lack of signi￿cance of the in￿ ation term in Table 2 is robust to 2SLS estimation.
17The POP statistics are taken from the International Financial Statistics database maintained by the IMF,
while INCOME and CBI are taken from Romer (1993).
16for the interaction between openness and the exchange rate regime. Population size is an e⁄ective
instrument for the term OPEN in OPEN ￿ EX. It is more di¢ cult to identify informative
instruments for the exchange rate regime indicator, EX. One possibility is that conservative
central banks are more likely to enforce ￿xed exchange rate regimes, and we therefore include
CBI in the instrument. Of course, CBI may itself be endogenous, but we believe that it is
much less likely to be so than the exchange rate regime indicator - the Sargan test outcome
suggests that CBI is a valid instrument, though it should be noted that the small sample size
used here may distort inferences based upon that procedure. The results in column (1) indicate
that the e⁄ects of openness and the exchange rate regime on the slope of the Phillips curve
increase relative to the OLS estimates in column (6) in Table 1, though due to the increased
uncertainty in the estimation the coe¢ cient on OPEN actually loses signi￿cance. Still, we
interpret this model as evidence that the relationship between the slope of the Phillips curve,
trade openness and the exchange rate regime is not driven by endogeneity bias. In order to check
the robustness of this ￿nding, in estimating model (2) we delete CBI from the instrument set
and add INCOME and its square, the idea being that the choice of exchange rate regime may
be income related. The coe¢ cient estimates are of the same magnitude as those in column (6)
of Table 1 (the OLS estimates), but due to an increase in estimation uncertainty the statistical
signi￿cance of the e⁄ects decreases. We interpret this evidence as a symptom of the fact that it
is di¢ cult to identify reliable instruments for the exchange rate regime rather than a sign that
past results were driven by endogeneity bias.
5 Summary
This paper has examined empirical evidence on the relationship between openness to trade and
the slope of the Phillips curve. The importance of controlling for supply-side in￿ uences on
output and in￿ ation when measuring the slope of the Phillips curve, and of accounting for ￿xed
exchange rate regimes in testing the implications of the theoretical models was emphasised.
Results obtained for a sample of 19 countries indicated that greater openness to trade increases
the slope of a country￿ s short-run Phillips curve provided that the exchange rate of that country
is free to adjust to shifts in monetary policy. Such a condition is crucial, for it ensures that
￿ uctuations in economic activity are associated with the changes in import prices necessary to
accelerate in￿ ation adjustment. The result is consistent with the models of the output-in￿ ation
tradeo⁄ in Romer (1993) and Lane (1997).
The robustness of the evidence was considered in some detail. It was shown that the correla-
tion between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve derives from those countries that have
followed ￿ exible exchange rate regimes. Consequently the strength of the relationship estimated
from a sample comprising ￿xed, semi-￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rate countries is sensitive to
excluding certain countries from the analysis. We therefore interpret our results as preliminary
support for the Romer-Lane hypothesis - more concrete evidence concerning this theoretical pre-
diction can only be obtained through studying the Phillips curve in a larger sample of ￿ exible
exchange rate countries.
17Appendix A: An open economy model of the Phillips curve (Romer (1993))
This appendix reviews the theoretical basis for the result in Romer (1993) that the slope
of the Phillips curve is related to openness to trade. Romer considers a country that imports
fraction a of the goods that its citizens consume. If e is the change from the preceding period in
the log exchange rate, p￿ the change in the log price index for foreign goods in foreign currency
units, and p the change in the log price index for domestically produced goods in domestic
currency units. Then the rate of consumer price in￿ ation, x, is given by
x = a(e + p￿) + (1 ￿ a)p
Romer then assumes that an individual￿ s utility from consumption is a CES combination
of his or her consumptions of di⁄erent goods, with ￿ < 1 denoting the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution between any two goods. Given that goods produced at home and abroad are
imperfect substitutes in consumption, an expansion of domestic output drives down the relative
price of domestically produced goods:
e + p￿ ￿ p = ￿(y ￿ y￿)
where y is the change in log domestic output and y￿ the change in log foreign output.
Assuming that fraction f of domestic prices are ￿ exible in the short-run and the remaining
1 ￿ f are rigid, the in￿ ation rate for domestically produced goods is
p = fp0 + (1 ￿ f)p￿
where p0 and p￿ are the rates of in￿ ation of prices that are ￿ exible in the short-run and those
that are ￿xed, respectively.
On the supply-side, it is assumed that ￿ exible price in￿ ation relative to consumer price
in￿ ation is an increasing function of output. If prices are initially at their equilibrium values
then we have
p0 ￿ x = ￿y
Finally, money demand is given by
m ￿ p = y
where m is the change in the log money stock. Analogous equations describe the rest of
the world, which for simplicity consists of a single country. Letting an asterisk denote a foreign
variable:
x￿ = ap￿ + (1 ￿ a)(p ￿ e)
p￿ = fp0￿ + (1 ￿ f)p￿￿
p0￿ ￿ x￿ = ￿y￿
18m￿ ￿ p￿ = y￿
Given these behavioural relations the e⁄ects of an increase in the money supply on output,














￿f[(1 ￿ f) + f(￿ + ￿)] + (1 ￿ f)a￿(1 + f￿)
￿
where
￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ f) + ￿f][(1 ￿ f) + (￿ + ￿)f]
It can be seen that the e⁄ect of a monetary expansion on output is smaller in a more
open economy, and that its e⁄ects on both domestic and CPI in￿ ation are larger. Thus, the
output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄,
dy
dx is less favourable in a more open economy.
Appendix B: Variable de￿nitions and sample periods
The variables used in equations (3)-(5) are de￿ned below. All variables are in seasonally
adjusted form, and, unless otherwise stated, refer to natural logarithms of the variables mea-
sured. The data sources are the OECD quarterly national accounts and the IMF￿ s International
Financial Statistics, unless otherwise stated.
p is the consumer price index (CPI). The CPI excludes mortgage interest payments in all
countries except Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States (pre-1983
in the US case). In order to ensure the comparability of price data across countries, we use the
implicit consumption de￿ ator as the measure of prices for those four countries.
ulc is average unit labour costs for the whole economy and is constructed as follows:
unit labour costs = total wages and salaries - constant price GDP
usoil is the US$ price of a barrel of crude oil. These data were supplied by John Muellbauer.
gap measures the deviation of constant price GDP, yt, from a stochastic trend. This measure
of the output gap is closely related to that in Aron and Muellbauer (2000) and draws on the
STAMP computer package of Koopman, Harvey, Doornik and Shephard (1995). Log income,
yt, is modelled as the sum of a smooth trend (￿t), a trigonometric function ({t) and an error
term ("t), i.e. we have
yt = c + ￿￿t + %{t + "t; "t ￿ NID (0;v2
")
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t￿1 + ￿t; ￿t ￿ NID (0;v2
￿)






















where c is a constant, p{, 0 < p{ ￿ 1, is a damping factor, ￿ is the frequency (in radians)
of the cyclical term, and ￿t and ￿￿
t are two mutually uncorrelated NID disturbances with zero
mean and common variance v2
￿. The estimation of the model proceeds in two steps. A maximum
likelihood technique is used to compute estimates of the unknown variances and then the Kalman
￿lter is passed through the data in order to give the estimated coe¢ cients. Trend GDP is de￿ned
as c+￿￿t, and the output gap is measured as yt￿c￿￿￿t. This measure of the output gap is to
be preferred to the Hodrick-Prescott measure, for it does not rely on any arbitrary calibration of
the variance of the trend term. Further, the problem of excessive variation in the trend towards
the end of the sample that is known to a⁄ect the Hodrick-Prescott method is less severe in the
present case due to the presence of the trigonometric term, which captures cyclical variation in
the data and therefore restricts movements in the trend.
Sample periods
The sample periods used to ￿t equations (3)-(5) were as follows: Australia: 1976q1-1997q3.
Austria: 1976q1-1995q4. Belgium: 1981q2-1997q3. Canada: 1978q2-1997q1. Denmark: 1978q1-
1993q4. Finland: 1976q2-1997q3. France: 1979q2-1994q2. Germany: 1976q1-1997q3. Greece:
1981q2-1991q1. Italy: 1976q1-1996q3. Japan: 1979q1-1997q3. Netherlands: 1978q2-1997q3.
New Zealand: 1981q4-1997q3. Norway: 1979q1-1997q3. Spain: 1981q2-1996q4. Sweden:
1976q1-1997q2. Switzerland: 1976q2-1997q3. United Kingdom: 1976q1-1997q3. United States:
1976q1-1997q3.
Appendix C: The PC index
The measures of the slope of the Phillips curve, PC, that we obtain using the methods
described in section 3 are as follows: Australia (.4287), Austria (0), Belgium (.3426), Canada
(1.2497), Denmark (0), Finland (.6671), France (1.0485), Germany (.3037), Greece (1.0600),
Italy (0), Japan (.4538), Netherlands (0), New Zealand (1.3095), Norway (.4077), Spain (0),
Sweden (.1381), Switzerland (.4375), United Kingdom (.3922), United States (.2477).
Appendix D: Notes on the construction of the EX dummy
Figure 2 presents measures of the volatility of linearly detrended nominal e⁄ective exchange
rate data for 19 countries. The abbreviations used are as follows: AUS=Australia, AU=Austria,
BE=Belgium, CA=Canada, DE=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece,
IT=Italy, JA=Japan, NE=Netherlands, NZ=New Zealand, NO=Norway, SA=South Africa,
SP=Spain, SW=Sweden, SWI=Switzerland, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. We
choose to divide the sample into three sub-groups, each corresponding to a di⁄erent level of
exchange rate volatility. These are indicated by the solid dividing lines in Figure 2. To be sure,
the exchange rate regime indicator, e, is set to 0 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Norway (the ￿xed exchange rate group), to 1 for Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK (the semi-￿xed exchange rate group), and to 2
20for Australia, Greece, Japan, New Zealand and the United States (the ￿ exible exchange rate
group).
Figure 2: Detrended exchange rate volatilities
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